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Abstract 
The processes of  agricultural policy decision-making in the East Asian economies 
of  Japan, Taiwan, and Korea are characterized by the complex interactions of 
competing special interest groups in their respective political arenas. An analytical 
model is designed to investigate how adjustments in rice price policies are 
endogenously related to the political economic forces associated with macroeconomic 
changes. The model is tested against the case of Korean rice price policy, which has not 
been satisfactorily explained in earlier modeling efforts. A political preference function 
is used to estimate the relative political weights of  producers, consumers, and 
government over a 25-year period (1961-1985) during which major macroeconomic 
changes occurred. A simultaneous 12-equation model is then constructed to explore the 
effects of  the macroeconomic changes on the rice pricing decisions through the 
estimated political weights. Highly significant econometric results are obtained to 
explain the pattern of increasing political influence of producers relative to that of 
consumers and government Simulation experiments show how the patterns in the rice 
economy are linked to macroeconomic change. The results obtained, thus far, open the 
way for methodological improvements to further our functional understanding of 
agricultural policy adjustments in Korea and other East Asian economies. 
Key words:  endogenous rice policy, political macroeconomy, political preference 
function, political weights, econometric simulation, East Asia, Korea 
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THE KOREAN RICE ECONOMY 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the process of  economic change over time, agriculture's declining share of total 
output is one of a number of  variables indicating sttuctural adjustments at the 
macroeconomic level. This phenomenon has been a starting point for many analytical 
studies that have explored the dynamic patterns and trends of sectoral changes in agriculture 
(Chenery and Syrquim, 1975; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; Ercolani, 1986; Yamauchi, 1987; 
Anderson, 1987). It is generally appreciated that the nature of  agricultural policy 
adjustments that accompany such structural changes are governed by complex political 
economic interrelations. From a historical perspective, it has become evident that the 
economic forces associated With macroeconomic changes are sources of  primary influence 
that culminate in government actions in the agricultural sector (Rausser, 1988). 
Accordingly, it can be inferred that political activities on behalf of  fann interests are 
likely to escalate as structural macroeconomic changes result in unfavorable conditions for 
the operating level where the decisions on actual farm inputs and outputs are made. That is, 
political activities of  agricultural interest groups to change farm policies are functionally 
related to their needs to adjust to new economic realities. Furthermore, the process of 
agricultural adjustments as reflected at the macro level usually involves government actions 
that are not exogenously given as in many economic models. Rather, such government 
actions are, in fact, endogenous variables in the real political economic systems where the 
evolution of  interest groups and their policy-influencing powers are functionally related to 
the structural changes in the macroeconomy. 
The recent efforts in The Political Economy of  Agricultural Protection  (Anderson 
and Hayami, 1986) have drawn attention to the need to better understand the growth of 
agriCUltural protection in the three East Asian economies of lapan, Korea, and Taiwan. 
These three economies have experienced rapid structural changes in recent decades, 
1 necessitating substantial resource adjustments in their respective rice sectors. It has been 
observed that unique and complex systems of  political economic relations have evolved in 
each of these countries to modify and implement their particular rice policy rules. However, 
the analytical modeling methods used to explain the agricultural policy adjustments have 
tended to treat the actions of  governments as exogenous to the private market economy 
rather than endogenous to the macroeconomy as a whole. In this paper, we adopt an 
analytical institutional economics approach to advancing our basic understanding of  the 
nature of agricultural policy adjustments in  East Asia, and offer some test results for the 
case of Korea. These results have encouraged us to extend the modeling technique to Japan 
and Taiwan with the hope of  contributing the kinds of  information needed to further 
evaluate and inteq>ret agricultural policy reforms in East Asia 
2.  PERSPECTIVE  ON  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY ADJUSTMENTS  IN  EAST ASIA 
From an international perspective. East Asia is relatively poorly endowed with 
arable land. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan each have fewer than 60 hectares of arable land per 
1  ()()() people, compared with a global average of  more than 300 hectares. The East Asian 
economies have recorded very high economic growth rates by international standards. 
During the two decades up to 1980, annual real per capita income growth averaged 6.3 
percent for Japan, 6.6 percent for Taiwan, and 6.9 percent for Korea These figures were 
almost twice the average for middle-income and industrial countries in the world (World 
Bank, 1983). 
With the rapid growth of these economies, the typical signs of structural changes are 
clearly evident, as shown in Table 1. The relative contributions of the agricultural sectors to the 
growth of  GNP have fallen dramatically. The declines in agricultural shares of  GDP and 
employment, and in Engels coefficient for food are clear indicators reflecting such agricultural 
adjustments. During the same peri~  pronounced increases in the nominal rates of agricultural 
protection in these economies have also become grossly apparent, in particular to their major 
2 trading partners. In 1960. the average nominal rate of  protection in Japan was 41 percent. and 
by 1985 this had increased to 210 percent. Taiwan and Korea have followed somewhat similar 
paths beginning with negative protection rates in 1960 and escalating to 55 and 166 percent 
respectively by 1981. These high nominal protection rates have been attributed to increased 
agricultural support programs and tighter import controls. among other things. 
Table 1.  Indicators of Economic  Structural Changes in  East Asia 
12m  12M  :mn  1m  mIl  12B3 
Japan 
GOP per capita (1975 US $)  1549  2376  3834  4456  5442  7817 
Real growth in total GOP (%)  10.1  a  5.0  b  3.8c 
Manufacturing  11.0  a  6.4  b  7.8c 
Agriculture  4.0  a  1.0  b  1.6c 
Agricultural share of: (%) 
GOP  10  7  5  4  3  3 
Labor force  27  21  16  11  9  8 
Engels coefficient (%)  43  39  36  35  31  29 
Nominal rate of ag protection (%)  41  69  74  76  85  210 
Taiwan 
GOP per capita (1975 US $)  372  500  686  952  1407  1750 
Real growth in total GOP (%)  9.2  a  9.5  b  6.1c 
Manufacturing  17.3  a  13.0  b  6.6c 
Agriculture  3.2  a  1.6  b  1.2c 
Agricultural share of: (%) 
GOP  26  22  14  12  7  5 
Labor force  50  46  37  30  19  17 
Engels coefficient (%)  61  56  51  52  43  41d 
Nominal rate of ag protection (%)  -3  -1  2  20  52  55e 
Korea 
GOP per capita (1975 US $)  233  278  415  593  792  1089 
Real growth in total GOP (%)  8.6  a  9.5  b  7.9C 
Manufacturing  17.6  a  16.6  b  9C 
Agriculture  4.4  a  3.2  b  6.3c 
Agricultural share of: (%) 
GOP  36  34  24  22  15  14 
Laborfon:e  60  53  46  40  35  25 
Engels coefficient (%)  58  62  56  56  52  37 
Nominal rate of  ag protection (%)  -15  -4  29  30  117  166' 
Source:  Anderson and Hayami (1986), adapted from Tables 1.1.2.5,3.1, updated. 
Notes: 
a =  1961-70 average, b =  1971-80 average, c =  1980-85 average, d =  1983 data. e =  1981 data. 
3 While policy prescriptions to reduce these growing proteetion rates have been 
offered based upon the attempts of  economists to measure the social costs of  government 
interventions, the traditional prescriptions calling on policymakers to get the prices right 
have not proved to be a sufficient basis for reform. It became evident that if  there were to 
be any hope for improving the situation through corrective policy measures, there had to be 
a better understanding of  the domestic conditions that give rise to these undesirable 
performances. If  protectionist policies were rooted primarily in domestic conditions rather 
than in the international economy, the underlying protectionist forces needed to be 
identified and understood in the context of the changing domestic economies. 
In spite of  substantial agricultural adjustment efforts at the micro level, the relative 
productivity of the agricultural sector on a macro level continued to deteriorate vis-a-vis the 
rapidly expanding industrial and service sectors. Domestic agricultural policy attention, 
therefore, had to focus on the issues relating to the growing welfare imbalances between 
the rural and urban sectors. The political economic conditions for policy decisions reflected 
the increasing economic base of the non-agricultural sectors, which served to support the 
declining agricultural populations. 
The implication was that the growth of the secondary industrial sector contributed to 
political economic conditions that were sensitive to the economic survival of  the declining 
agricultural sector. Accordingly, it could be expected that the decision criteria of 
policymakers systematically adjusted to the special needs of  the fann interests. In a broad 
sense, the political influences of  these special interest groups derive from a diverse set of 
historical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors. But in a narrower context, it was the 
effectiveness of  their lobbying and campaigning activities in changing the institutional 
"rules of  the game" that gave evidence of  their political power. 
This brief historical perspective suggests a systematic evolutionary process of 
agricultural policy adjustments in East Asia. Institutional changes reflected in these policy 
4 adjustments have been occmring within political economic systelm concerned primarily 
with domestic policy issues. In these decision systems, the changing political influence of 
agricultural interest groups and their ability to effect changes in institutional roles are 
closely in~lated  to macroeconomic changes. We need, at this point, an appropriate 
analytical framework that can utilize relevant political economic paradigms and empirical 
models for testing hypotheses on the endogenous behavior of  interest groups, including 
government, in the process of  adjusting agricultural policy. 
3. POLITICAL  ECONOMIC  ApPROACHES  AND  LIMITATIONS  FOR  EAST ASIA 
To address questions on how and why economic policies evolve, we need to reach 
beyond the static paradigms of  traditional welfare and trade economics that tend to treat 
government actions as exogenous. The notable attempts at fonnalizing political economic 
approaches to empirically test the endogenous policies of  government  in U.S. agriculture 
were reviewed by Rausser et ale (1982), and since then, new test results have been added 
to the literature. Conceptually, political economic approaches rely on such paradigms as 
liberal-pluralism, Marxist theory of  the state, the theory of  economic regulation, the theory 
of  rent-seeking, and the theory of  efficient government redistribution. The literature is vast 
and is widely applicable to many fields of  economics with varying degrees of  success 
depending upon such factors as the scope and focus of  decision-making and the particular 
conditions that govern political economic decisions and institutional change in each case. 
For East Asia, the works in Anderson and Hayami (1986) rely primarily on the 
liberal-pluralism behavior of  politicians whose actions are designed to maximize votes and 
keep them in office. In Chapter 4 of their book, the results of  an econometric analysis of 
the determinants of  agricultural protection levels are reported by Honma and Hayami (also, 
1986).  They conclude that the rapid rise in agricultural protection rates (in nominal terms) 
from 1955 to 1980 was due largely to three factors: (i) the rapid decline in the comparative 
5 advantage in agriculture, (il) the systematic fall of  agriculture's share in the total economy 
(in terms of  both output and labor), and (iii) the shifts in the international terms of  trade. 
However, the key empirical estimates that attempt to explain the growth of 
protection rates with declining agricultural shares and weakening comparative advantages in 
agricultural trade, both domestically and internationally, are not entirely satisfactory, 
particularly for the case of  Korea. Aside from measmement and specification errors that are 
always likely to be present in such econometric studies, the simple rationale of  maximizing 
votes within "political economic markets" for agricultural policies leaves too many 
questions concerning the structure, functioning, and performance of  agricultural policy 
adjustments unanswered. The underlying ethics of  liberal-pluralistic societies may differ 
fundamentally, and these differences are likely to be manifested in the institutions that 
govern decision-making at all levels. The fallacy of  treating institutions as factors that could 
be brought into demand-supply equilibrium in a political marketplace was clearly exposed 
two decades ago by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1969). 
It is well known that industrializing countries implement agricultural policies to shift 
the burden of  adjustment to the non-agricultural sectors. But that in itself does not 
necessarily lead to high protection rates and distortionary trade policies. There are always 
offsetting factors operating in a changing economy. Honma and Hayami allow for this by 
including the comparative advantage and international terms of  trade variables that imply 
different natural resource endowments. As long as the agricultural sectors of  resource-rich 
economies can maintain a strong international comparative advantage in trade over their 
resource-poor trading partners, their domestic agricultural support policies need not 
necessarily result in high protection rates. Thus, the land resource-abundant economies of 
the Pacific such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have continued 
to maintain relatively low agricultural protection rates in spite of  the fact that they have also 
experienced similar structural shifts. But in the case of Korea, agricultural protection rates 
were already high by international standards even at the early stage of  economic 
6 development when its agricultural share in the economy was still relatively high. The key 
variables through which the declining agricultural share~ comparative disadvantage, and 
international terms of  trade operate to explain high protection rates have not yet been 
adequately specified and empirically tested. 
4.  AN ALTERNATIVE  POLmCAL MACROECONOMIC  ApPROACH 
An alternative approach that provides for the explicit treatment of  government 
actions as endogenous factors in empirical models is the efficient government redistribution 
approach. This approach dates back to the works of  Rausser and Freebaim (1974) and 
Zusman (1976), and focuses on the political economic functioning of  a system where the 
values of  economic variables and policy instruments are endogenously detennined. The 
critical role of special interest groups in the fonnulation of  fann policy are recognized and 
taken into account in a political preference function that reflects the welfare measures (or 
economic objectives) of  each interest group. More recently, the potential applicability of 
this approach to analyzing changes in agricultural,policy has been demonstrated by Sarris 
and Freebaim (1983) and by Paarlberg and Abbott (1986), in both cases for the 
international wheat economy. 
The political preference function is designed to detect and measure the relative 
political powers (weights) of  different interest groups in changing the institutional rules of 
agricultural policies to their benefit. Conceptually, the resulting weights can be interpreted 
in terms of  an equilibrium solution to a political economic bargaining game. If  the weights 
are differentiated according to the effectiveness of  each interest group's pursuit of  its 
welfare measures, the implication is that the priority rankings of  policymakers have, 
indeed, been responsive to the group's interests. Thus, these weights can be potentially 
useful aids in policy analyses. They can be used to detect whether differences exist among 
interest groups and, if  so, what directions these differences are taking. Also, since these 
7 differences can be related to policy changes over ~  the weights have direct implications 
for the direction and degree of  changes in policies for the future. 
Further, since macroeconomic changes are major SOUICCS of  influence on the 
performance of  the agricultural sector, the relationships between selected macroeconomic 
variables and the political weights can be empirically tested. The establishment of  such 
empirical relationships would then provide better insight into the effects of  macroeconomic 
changes on the political influence of  interest groups in agricultural policymaking. Such an 
analytical approach offers the possibility of  overcoming some of the previously discussed 
limitations of  earlier studies and developing more relevant criteria and information on the 
functional economic nature of  agricultural policy adjustments over time. 
s.  MODEL FOR  EMPIRICAL  ApPLICATION IN  EAST ASIA 
The structural components of  the political macroeconomic systems of  East Asian 
rice economies can be described by three sets of  equations grouped as follows: (i) 
economic structural equations. (ii) endogenous policy decision equations. and (iii) political 
macroeconomic system equations. The model focuses on measuring how policymakers 
accommodate the competing efforts of  interest groups to influence rice price policy for their 
own benefit, in relation to changing macroeconomic environments. 
$.1. Sttycture of the Domestic Rice Economy 
The structure of the domestic rice economy in an East Asian society is reflected in 
its supply of  and demand for rice. In the model, supply and demand are specified in terms 
of  domestic production and domestic consumption that clears the market. The following 
implicit functions may be specified in simple linear terms. Tunc subscripts are omitted. 
Domestic production is a function of  the ratio of  domestic producer prices divided by the 
producer cost index. 
8 DP = Fl(PDPIPAI)  (1) 
Domestic consumption is a function of  the ratio of  domestic consumer prices divided by the 
consumer price index, and per capita inco~· 
DC = F2(CDP/CPI, PGNP)  (2) 
where: 
DP and DC are the quantities supplied and demanded, 
PDP and CDP are the current prices faced by domestic producers and consumers, 
PGNP is per capita income, 
PAl is the index of  prices paid by producers, 
CPI is consumer price index. 
The market-clearing constraint accounts for changes in storage and net imports. Thus, 
domestic production is equal to domestic consumption plus net changes in stock minus net 
imports. 
DP = DC + (ST - STl) - NIM  (3) 
where: 
ST and STI are the rice stocks in the CU1Tent and previous years respectively, 
NIM is net imports of  rice. 
5.2. Endo~nous  Policy Decisions 
5.2.1. Political Preference Function/or Policy Decisions 
Endogenous policy decisions are reflected in the  political preference function 
model. In the context of  the rice economies of  East Asia, the political preference function 
attempts to capture the influence of  the producers, consumers, and government agencies in 
setting the levels of  domestic prices for rice to producers (PDP) and to consumers (CDP). 
The model is specified in simple weighted additive terms as follows. 
W =  WP"'UP + WC"'UC + WG"'UG 
where: 
WP, WC, and WG are the political weights attached to the rice producers, 
consumers, and government respectively, 
(4) 
UP, Uc, and UG are the welfare measures of  the rice producers, consumers, and 
government respectively. 
It is assumed that there exists a rice policymaker who arbitrates the conflicting 
objectives of  interest groups seeking their own benefits from the rice policy. If so, the 
9 political weights (wp, WC, and WO) attempt to capture the marginal values accruing to the 
welfare measures of  respective interest groups as a result of  political bargaining among 
themselves. These weights also reflect the political willingness of  the policymaker to 
redistribute income through adjusting the rice policy based on the assumption that the rice 
policymaker selects policy instruments to maximize the political preference function. The 
weights are associated with each interest group's welfare measure as follows. The 
producers' welfare (UP) is measured by a profit function that depends upon the price of 
rice received by the producers. The consumers' welfare (UC) is measured by an 
expenditure function that depends upon the price paid by the rice consumers at a given 
utility level. And fmally, the government's welfare is measured by the net fiscal balance in 
implementing the rice management program after accounting for all receipts from 
consumers and outlays to producers, importers, and for storage costs. 
UP = P(PDP)  (5) 
uc = - E(CDP, Ucons)  (6) 
UO = CDP*DC - PDP*DP - BPR*NIM + (pDP - CDP)*(ST - STl)  (7) 
where: 
P(.) is the profit function of  rice producers, 
E(.) is the rice expenditure function of  consumers for given utility level Ucons, 
BPR is the border price for rice. 
The first term on the RHS of  equation (7) is the revenue from selling rice to 
consumers, and the second and third terms are costs of  purchasing domestic production 
and importing, respectively_ The fourth term represents both outlays (negative) and receipts 
(positive) from adding to or drawing down on the rice stock. Thus, the government's 
interest (as viewed from the vantage of  policymakers) accounts for the distribution of social 
revenues and costs of  agricultural rice policy incident upon consumers, producers, 
exporters, and taxpayers. 
10 5.2.2. Approach to Quantifying the Political Weights 
A set of  computational formulas for the political weights was derived by 
maximizing the political preference function W given in equation (4), subject to the market- - . -... 
clearing constraint of  equation (3) with respect to the two main policy instruments, the 
producers' domestic price (PDP) and the consumers' domestic price (CDP).  The 
underlying assumption for pluralistic societies is that  the actual price levels approximate the 
political optimal policy (ie., the revealed preference assumption in Rausser and Freebaim, 
1974, and in Gardner, 1987).  From the first order conditions, the following formulas 
were derived with the sum of the political weights nonnalized to equal 300. 
WG = 300/(X+Y+l) 
WP=300-WG- WG*Y 
WC = 300 - WG - WP 
where: 
X = (DP+(pDP·BPR)*[i)DP!O(PDPIPAI)]+ST-(STl)}IDP, 
Y = (DC+(CDP-BPR)*[i)DCfc)(CDP/CPI)]+ST-(STl) }IDC, 
i)DP!O(pDPIPAI) is the price coefficient of  domestic production, 




If  there are different political attitudes toward the interest groups in the 
policymaking process, political weights will be differentiated since the weights are 
designed to represent the political willingness of  policymakers to favor one interest group 
over another. When the weights are tested to be different among interest groups, we can 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no political willingness to adjust the rice policy in 
favor of  a particular group. In that case, political weights may vary with changing political 
circumstances. For this purpose, we assume that the policymakers are aware of  the 
underlying domestic behavioral relationships that are stable over time. 
5.23. Determination of  Endogenous Rice Price Policy 
Once the political weights are quantified, we can derive the fonnulas for the 
endogenous domestic prices. By simply rearranging equations (11), (12), and (13) we 
have the following relationships that reflect political and economic ,influences. 
1 1 
o PDP: BPR + (DP*WP/WG -DP-ST+STl)/(oDP/O(PDP/PAI)  (11) 
COP: BPR + (DC*WC/WG -DC-ST  +STl)/(oDClO(COP/CP1)  (12) 
From these equation~  it is possible to evaluate how the various political economic 
factors contribute to the establishment of  the endogenous price levels. From equation (11), 
for example, the increasing political weight of  producers relative to that of  consumers and 
government clearly shows how this contributed to the rising producer prices. 
Further, if  we move the border price variable (BPR) to the LHS of  equations (11) 
and (12), we can see how the political economic factors influence the differences between 
the domestic and international prices in equations (13) and (14). 
PDP-BPR = (DP*WP/WG-DP-ST  +STl)/(oDP!O(pDP/PAI) 
COP-BPR = (DC*WClWG-DC-ST  +STl)/(oDClO(COP/CPI) 
(13) 
(14) 
These equations suggest the potential utility of the political weights in evaluating the 
historical changes in nominal protection rates of the Korean rice economy. Equation (13) 
suggests that it was again the surging political power of  rice producers that largely 
contributed to the widening price differentials between domestic producer prices and the 
international prices at the border. 
On the other hand, the difference between producer and consumer prices is 
determined without regard to international border price~ which cancel out in equation (15). 
H~  the differences are influenced purely by domestic demand and supply factors that 
also are reflected in the political weights of  consumers and producers relative to that of 
governmenL 
COP-PDP = (DC*WC/WG-DC-ST  +STl)/(oDClO(COP/CPI)  -
(DP*WP/WG-DP-ST+STl)/(oDP!O(PDP/PAI)  (15) 
5.3. Cbannels of  Macroeconomic Influences on the Domestic Rice Economy 
Once the political weights of  interest groups are shown to have significant influence 
on rice policy decisions, our next step is to test for macroeconomic factors that. may be 
functionally related to changes in the political weights. Macroeconomic changes and their 
12 links to the agricultural sector have been shown to have significant causal relationships to 
policy developments in the United States, leading to government intervention in agriculture 
(Andrews and Rausser, 1986). 
The conceptual framework in which the macroeconomic forces are translated into rice 
policymaking is presented sequentially in Figure 1. Changing macroeco~mic  factors enter a 
"political black box" where conflicting interests lobby to adjust the institutional framework and 
rules that govern operating decisions at the farm level and the ultimate performance of the rice 
economy. 
Figure 1.  Conceptual  Framework of Political  Macroeconomy of Rice  Economy 
acroeconomlc  nVironments:  Agncu  s 
GNP Parity price ratio, Rural- Urban income ratio, 
Deficits of budgets, Income, Inflation, Exchange rate. 
Political Black Box:  Social value, Historical value, 
Political Campaign, Legal and Institutional System. 
Rice Price Policy Adjustments : 
Producer's price, Consumers' price 
Per 0l1Danct 0  ~1at..EconoJDI..: 
Domestic Production, Domestic "U>nsumption, Stock 
Rice imports 
• 
13 The political mechanisms through which macroeconomic forces are translated into 
political pressure for policy adjustments are part of  the '-POlitical black box.  tt Attention is 
focused on how macroeconomic forces are transmitted to rice policy adjustments that are 
brought about through the policy-influencing efforts of  interest groups. The actual 
transmission processes can be quite complicated and includ~ both forward and backward 
linkages between the rice economy and the macroeconomy. The selection of  macrovariables 
depends upon the particular political economic conditions of  an economy. 
6. EMPIRICAL  TEST OF THE KOREAN  RICE ECONOMY 
The role of  the Korean government  in the domestic rice economy has been a major 
factor in the political macroeconomy of  agricultural policy adjustments since direct 
government procurements of  rice from the fanners began in 1961. Ever since then, there 
has been much political conflict over detennining the government procurement price, which 
impacts directly on the income and welfare of  rural fanners and urban consumers. 
It can be inferred that the changing macroeconomic conditions over the past 25 
years created political pressures to adjust rice prices in accordance with the special interests 
involved. The Korean rice economy offers an opportunity to specify and empirically test a 
political macroeconomic modeling framework for expanding our knowledge of  the 
agriculture policy adjustment process. 
6.1. Empirical Model for the Korean Rice Economy 
We construct an econometric model, consisting of 10 behavioral equations and two 
identities. Since our focus is on testing the effects of  macroeconomic changes on domestic 
rice policies, our initial selection of  macrovariables is based on previously identified 
factors. The political economic system of  the Korean rice economy linked to the 
performance of the macroeconomy is summarized as follows: 
14 I) Structural Equations of  the Rice Economy 
(1) DP = fl(LAG(pDPJPAI), FWI/SAI, LAG(DP), DUMI) 
(2) DC = t2(COP/CPI, GNP/POP, LAG(DC) 
(3) NIM = DC - DP + ST -LAG(ST) 
2) Endogenous Policy Decisions 
(4) PDP = f3(USBPR*EX, PAl, LAG(DP)*WP/WG, LAG(FWI) 
(5) COP = f4(USBPR *EX, CPI, OC*WClWG, LAG(COP» 
3) Political Macroeconomy of Rice 
(6) WG = f5(GMFD, GVO, LAG(WG), DUM2) 
(7) WP = f6(SAI/PAI, DP/DC, RRUI, GNPNGNP, DUM2) 
(8) wc  = n(GNP/POp, COP/CPI, LAG(WC» 
(9) CON = f8(GNP, LAG(CON» 
(10) MS = t9(LAG(MS), GMFD, GVO, GNP) 
(II) CPI = flO(LAG(MS), GNP, SAl, LAG(CPI) 
(12) GNP = CON + INV + GVC + GX - GM 
- where: 
SAI/P  AI is the parity price index (ratio of  prices received [SAl] to the prices paid 
[PAl] by fanners), 
DP/DC is the self-sufficiency rate, 
RRUI is the ratio of  rural household income to urban household income, 
GNP  A is the aggregated value of  agricultural products, 
GNP is the gross national product, 
GNP/POP is the per capita GNP, 
COP/CPI is the real consumer price for rice, 
GMFD is the defICits of  the Grain Management Fund (GMF), 
GVO is the total government budget deficits, 
CON is the aggregate consumption, 
USBPR *EX is the border price of rice in tenns of  Korean won, 
DUMI and DUM2 are dummy variables, 
MS is the money supply, 
INV is the gross investment, 
GVC is the government expenditure, 
GX is the gross exports, 
GM is the gross imports. 
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Figure 1. Schematic  Diagram of Model 
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UNKAGBS Figure 2 illustrates the major linkages among the relevant variables. Basically, 
macroeconomic factors play major roles in bringing about functional linkages among the 
variables. Based on the empirical findings presented in the following sections, we discuss 
the political macroeconomic system of  the Korean rice industry. 
6.2. Quantificatioo Qf Political Wcidtts for Korean Rice EcoOomy 
Figure 3 shows the results of  applying equations (8), (9), and (10) with data from 
official Korean sourees covering the 25-yearperiod 1961-1985. The estimated patterns and 
trends are significantly different from the 100 baseline and pairwise among the three 
interest groups at the 5 percent level. The changing political weights clearly indicate that 
Korean rice policymakers favored producers by raising prices for their outputs. This 
implies an increased political willingness to redistribute income in favor of  rural fanners. 
Their political weights increased by about 30 percentage points, while those of  consumers 
and government both fell by about  -15 percentage points over the period. 
In other words, the welfare of  rice farmers (indicated by their income status) gained 
in the preference ranking of  policymakers relative to that of  consumers (expenditures) and 
the government (net revenues). This is consistent with the historical perspective of  rice 
policy in Korea. The present  government  policy of  direct rice purchases from farmers 
began  in 1961. But it wasn't until about 1968 that the food agency began increasing the 
purchase prices. The effects of the first oil crisis in 1973-1974 is clearly seen in the 
opposite swings in the political weights as the border price of  rice shot sharply upwards. 
This temporary situation corrected itself in a couple of years as the government's domestic 
purchase prices continued to escalate in favor of  the rice producers and border prices 
stabilized at a lower leveL The second oil shock in the late 1970's had little effect  on the 
border prices as the official domestic purchase prices continued to increase. A poor harvest 
in 1980 led to further sharp increases in producer and consumer prices, which then tended 
to correct themselves with better harvests in the following years. 
• 
17 Figure  3.  Political  Weights  for  the  Korean  Rice  Economy 
140 
130 
10  - 120  ~ 
=  • 
==  110 
•  .2 
::  100 




1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
Y.ar 
6.3. Discussion of the Estimated Simultaneous Equations 
The estimated results of 10 behavioral equations representing the political 
macroeconomic system are discussed in this section. Since the mathematical structure of  the 
model is nonlinear, the nonlinear three-stage least square method (N3SLS) was used to 
insure high efficiency in estimating the parameters. The numbers in parentheses below the 
estimated coefficients are t-values. 
63.1. Domestic Rice Production Function 
DP = - 1296.13 + 5.0344*LAG(PDP/PAI) + 0.3829*LAG(DP) 
(3.11)  (3.37) 
+ 2136. 17*(FWIISAI) - 2183.5*DUMI 
(4.48)  (-7.60) 
R2 =0.8577 
1 8 The price faced by rice producers in the previous year was found to have significant 
positive impact on domestic rice production at the 1 percent level This indicates that 
farmers responded strongly to the high price support for rice. The significance of  the 
lagged (OP) variable is consistent with the time it takes farmers to expand their paddy lands 
for rice production in response to the price signal. 
The index of  real farm wage rate was involved as a proxy for the input prices 
because farm wages took a major portion of  agricultural management expenditures. Farm 
wages deflated by the price reCeived index were found to be highly significant (at the 
lpercent level) but with an unexpected positive coefficient. This means that although 
farmers suffered from increasing labor costs due to rural manpower shortages, the high rice 
price supports were sufficient to provide them with incentives to increase their rice 
production. The highly significant dummy variable coefficient isolates the severe negative 
impact of  bad weather on rice production in 1981. 
6.3.2. Domestic Rice Consumption Function 
DC = 1657.5 + 0.11805*(CDP/CPI) + 1.2584*(GNPIPOP) + 0.44008*LG(DC) 
(0.16)  (3.02)  (3.18) 
R2 = 0.8984 
The consumer price for rice expressed in real tenns (CDP/CPI) was found to be 
insignificant as its low t value, 0.16, indicates. This is simply explained by the fact that 
changes in consumption prices over time reflect the interactions of  both supply and demand 
forces. and in this case, the rise in prices had no discernible effect on aggregate rice 
consumption. 
On the other hand, changes in per capita real income were found to be highly 
significant in their strong positive effect on aggregate rice consumption. This was also true 
for the lagged DC coefficient. Together, these effects can be interpreted as follows. As 
incomes rose and the price of  rice changed relative to that of  other food products, gradual 
19 
/ shifts in diets may have occurred, but the impacts on aggregate rice consumption continued 
to be positive with a geometric lag. 
633. Functional Effects on Government's Weight 
WG = 79.504 - 0.OO53591*GVD - 0.OO31151*GMFD + 0.19181*LAG(WG) 
(-4.21)  (-6.67 )  (2.30) 
+ 13 .  .541*DUM2 
(7.16) 
R2= 0.8531 
High fann price support programs in Korea have led to accumulating deficits in the 
government's food agency budget As the size of  these deficits continued to mount and the 
competition for scarce public resources increased, the political bargaining attitude of 
policymakers and government agencies toward increasing fann price support programs 
tended to tighten up. 
Increasing deficits in the overall government budget (GVD) and in the Grain 
Management Fund (GMFD) were both found to be inversely related to the declining 
political weight of  government at highly significant levels. The political influence of 
government in the decision criteria for rice policy appeared to weaken with the increased 
spending and accumulation of  debts throughout the public sector. Here again the influence 
of the downward trend in the relative political weight of  government was reflected in the 
significant coefficient for the LAG(WG) variable. 
In 1974, the price of  rice soared in the international market as a result of  the first oil 
shock. The dummy variable captured the highly significant effect of  the unstable global 
price conditions on the political weight of  government This was due mainly to the 
narrowing difference between the border price and the domestic price for rice  • 
• 
20 63.4. Functionlll Effects on Producers' Weight 
WP = 76.575 - 0.95619*(GNPA/GNP ) + 0.004522*(SAIlPAI) + 0.3466*RRUI 
(-10.64)  (3.05)  (6.18) 
- 19.124*(DPIDC) - 21.118*DUM2 
(-2.12)  (-5.52) 
R2= 0.8975 
As expected, agriculture's declining share (GNPA/GNP) of  the growing total 
economy was found to be highly significant in enhancing the political attitude toward high 
rice price policy. Farm adjustment costs associated with the long-term structural changes in 
the economy are reasons for farmers to seek redress from government and not be left 
behind in the macroeconomic progress toward higher incomes. This was evidenced in 
Korea by the highly significant positive coefficients for the price parity ratio (SAIIPAI) and 
the rural-urban income ratio (RRUI). The price parity ratio, or the ratio of  prices received 
by farmers to the prices paid by fanners, is indicative of  their profitability, and the ratio of 
rural household income to urban household income represents the income gap between the 
rural and urban sectors. The increasing political weight of  rice producers was clearly 
associated with improvements in both these ratios. 
The self-sufficiency rate (DPIDC) was found to be negatively related to the political 
weight of  producers. This result is consistent with the expectation that political support for 
increasing rice prices weakens as the self-sufficiency rate improves. The significance of  the 
dummy variable suggests that high bonJerprices for rice in 1974 led to weakening the 
political weight of  producers since the perceived need to protect domestic rice producers 
from low international prices was lessened. 
63.5. Functional Effects on Consumers' Weight 
we = 65.942 - 0.01408*(GNP/POP) + 0.004786*(CDP/CPI) + 0.3883*LAG(WC) 
(-3.46)  (0.63 )  (2.78) 
R2= 0.8386 
21 Rising per capita income (GNPIPOP) was found to be significantly related to the 
declining political weight of  consumers. This inverse relationship is consistent with the 
expectation that rising consumer income helps to offset the rising cost of  rice, and also 
contributes to shifting demands toward higher quality staple foods. The combined effect is 
to reduce the impact of  rising rice prices on the relative cost of  rice in household 
expenditures, thereby lessening the political sensitivity to rice price policy as evidenced by 
the insignificant (t = 0.63) coefficient  for consumers' real price (COP/CPl). Also, a 
reinforcing influence of the downward trend in the consumers' political weight is reflected 
in the significant coefficient for the LAG(WC) variable. 
63.6. Estimated Results of  Aggregate Consumption Function 
CON = 1157.1 + 0.17245*GNP + 0.71657*LAG(CON) 
(3.88)  (8.66) 
R2 =0.9977 
As expected, the coefficient of  GNP was found to be positive and highly 
significant. This is only being consistent with the theory that the level of income detennines 
the level of  consumption. As in some of the earlier equations, a significant lagged effect 
was present. In this case, consumption in the previous year is positively related to 
consumption in the cUIIent year. 
63.7. Estimated Results of  Money Supply Function 
MS = -324.92 + 1. 1164*LAG(MS) + O.I0290*GMFD + 1.2791*GVD 
(50.24)  (0.85)  (6.25) 
+ 0.02320*GNP 
0.96) 
R2 = 0.9983 
It has been suggested that the size of government deficits fmanced by printing 
money may raise the level of general prices. While increasing deficits in the overall 
government budget (GVD) were found to be highly significant in their positive relationship 
to the increasing supply of  money, the deficits of  the grain management fund (GMFD) 
22 
• were found to be statistically insignificant (t = 0.85). The implication is that Korean rice 
policymakers may not have been overly concerned with the potential inflation effects of 
increasing deficits in the grain management fund ~ting  from high price supports. 
63.8. Estimated Results of  Consumer Price Index Function 
CPI = 0.02086 - 0.()()()()()167*LAG(MS) + 0.00000205*GNP + 0.00612*SAI 




To detect any backward effects of changes in the rice economy on the general 
economy, the consumer price index was used as the dependent variable because of  its 
broad representation of  price conditions in the general economy. The highly significant 
positive coefficient for the level of  prices received by fanners (SAl) supports the 
hypothesis of backward linkage from the rice economy to the general economy. 
63.9 Functional Effects on Producers' Price Policy 
PDP = - 46.991 + 0.10994*(USBPR*EX/IO) + 388.69*PAI 
(0.76)  (2.58) 
+ 0.01499*(LAG(DP)*WP/WG) + 1.00286*LAG(FWI) 
(2.98)  (2.07) 
R2= 0.9945 
If  we want to predict and evaluate the government's rice policy in the political 
economic context, we need to explore the functional relationships between the producers' 
domestic price for rice and selected political economic variables. Prices paid by farmers 
(PAl) are significantly related to producers' price and support the hypothesis that increasing 
cost to fanners is a contributing factor in the decision to raise the purchasing price of  rice. 
Also, me statistical significance of  the positive coefficient to the politically weighted lagged 
domestic production variable [LAG(DP)*WP/WG] means that political reevaluations of  rice 
23 production rather than market valuations contribute to the persistent upward tendency of 
producers' prices. 
However, changes in border prices (USBPR  *EXlI0) were found to have an 
insignificant impact on the producers' price. This result implies separation of  domestic rice 
.  policy decisions concerning producer prices from the international rice market prices. 
63.10. Functional Effects on Consumers' Price Policy 
CDP = 59.783 + 0.3927*(USBPR*EXlI0» + 668.38*CPI - 3085*(DC*WC/WG) 
(4.25)  (7.53)  (-3.01) 
- 0.03379*LAG(CDP) 
(-0.29) 
R2 = 0.9938 
Although not significant with respect to producer prices, border prices were found 
to have a highly significant positive impact on the determination of  consumer prices. 
Apparently, Korean policymakers link border prices to their decisions on setting domestic 
consumer prices for rice. With respect to the consumer price index (CPI), the result 
suggests that decisions on consumer rice prices had significant effects on the general price 
level. The negative coefficient of  the politically weighted domestic rice consumption 
, (DC*WC/WG) variable suggests that, for any given amount of  rice consumption, the 
higher the political weight of  consumers relative to that of  government, the lower the 
consumer price of  rice is likely to be set. However, the one-year lagged consumer price for 
rice was found to have an insignificant effect on the decision to set current price levels for 
rice. 
6.4. Simulation Analysis of  Macroeconomic Impacts 
6.4.1. Test 0/ Model Validation 
Based on the estimated equations, we experimented with dynamic simulation 
analysis to explore the question of  how external macroeconomic changes affect endogenous 
rice prices and the Korean rice economy. To test the validity of the model for this purpose, 
a historical simulation covering the period from 1962 to 1985 was ~ed  out to compute 
24 
• the root mean square errors (RMSE) and root mean square percentage errors (RMSPE) of 
the simulated levels for the endogenous variables. Reasonable results were obtained, as 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Validation Test Results,  RMSE  and RMSPE  of Historical 
Simulation  (1962·1985) 
Variable  RMSE  RMPSE 
DP  766.62  19.93 
IX:  319.58  7.01 
PDP  23.89  17.34 
CDP  33.66  17.20 
CPI  0.02  8.88 
WG  2.21  2.41 
WP  4.07  3.75 
WC  2.65  2.64 
GNP  960.29  5.22 
CON  960.29  6.93 
MS  1667.74  36.26 
Except for the money supply variable (MS) with a RMSPE of 36.3 percent, all the 
other variables have less than 20 percent RMSPE with the best precision in the political 
weights (less than 4 percent). The direct and indirect uncertainty effects of  macro-level 
changes on the rice economy are reflected in the higher RMSPEs for domestic prices, 
production, and consumption. 
6.4.2. Results o/Macroeconomic Impacts Simldation 
Two simple scenarios of  macroeconomic changes were simulated for the period of 
1969-1985 to test the general effects of  expansionary versus conttactionary macroeconomic 
policies. In the expansionary macroeconomic policy, gross government expenditure, 
budget deficits, and exchange rates are increased by 20 percent per year. In the 
contractionary macroeconomic policy, the same three same macrovariables are decreased by 
20 percent per year. The results are summarized in Table 3. 
25 
• Table 3.  Dynamic  Impact of Macroeconomic Cbanles on  tbe 
Endolenous  Variables  (1969-1985) 
E3l1ansiwlaa: R21~1  ConDllaiWlaQ: IHlli~2 
Total Net Changes  Total  Net Change 
Amount  Percent  Amount  Percent 
DP (thous. mit)  2,791  78.9  -2,025  -26.6 
DC (thous. mit)  -1,281  -23.7  -4,039  -77.1 
PDP (10 thous. won/t)  87  66.9  -211  -44.8 
COP (10 thous. won/t)  282  112.1  -237  -26.9 
CPI (index)  -0.11  -30.8  -0.18  -45.3 
WG (index)  2.56  4.1  8.17  10.3 
WO(index)  26.5  26.4  -63.75  -55.2 
WC(index)  -10.27  -8.7  11.54  15.4 
NIM (thous. mit)  -4,071  -1831.1  -2,013  -2,956.1 
GNP (bil. real won)  7,696  17.8  -38,996  -123.2 
CON (bil. real won)  -4,498  -29.5  -26,802  -127.0 
MS (100 mil. current won)  33,714  499.9  -2,139  -71.6 
Nores : 
1. Expansionary macroeconomic policy is represenred by 20% per annum increases in aggregate demand 
variables to expand output. 
2. Cootractionary maaocconomic policy is represenred by 20% per annum reductions in aggregate 
demand variables to contract output. 
In the case of  expansionary policy, the total net increase of  producers' price is 870 
thousand Korean won per ton and the net rice production increases by 2,791 thousand tons 
for the period. On the other hand, simulation of  contractionary policy ~sults in a net 
decrease of  producers' price by 2,110 thousand won and production drops by 2,025 
thousand tons over the same period. 
We can derive the following implications from the simulated ~sults. First, 
macroeconomic expansion  is an important source of  strengthening the political efforts of 
rice producers to increase rice prices and production levels. Second, the political 
influencing power of  consumers with respect to rice prices gets weaker as the expansion of 
• 
26 the economy continues. As a result, consumer rice prices move upward, in spite of  a steady 
decline in the consumption of  rice. Third, the required amount of  rice imports is less in the 
expansionary phase than in the contractionary phase. This may be due to the fact that 
economic expansion leads to an increasing rate of  rice production as the rate of 
consumption declines. 
7. SUMMARY  CONCLUSIONS  AND  IMPLICATIONS 
Understanding the endogenous behavior of  government actions in agriculture has 
become an important prerequisite for designing alternative policy strategies to change the 
tide of  growing agricultural protectionism in East Asia. This is especially so since previous 
efforts at measuring the social costs of  protection have not proved to be sufficient for 
agricultural reform. Therefore, the thrust of  our efforts in this study has been to analyze the 
endogenous behavior of  government in adjusting agricultural policy. We have focused on 
the conceptual and methodological approaches to (i) measuring the political weights of 
special interest groups including producers, consumers, and government in the formulation 
of  agricultural policies, and (ii) measuring the macroeconomic detenninants of  changes in 
the political weights over time. An analytical model has been designed for East Asia with 
three major component parts including (i) structural equations representing the supply, 
demand, and market clearing functions for rice in the domestic economy, (ii) a political 
preference function to estimate the relative weights of  the interest groups in establishing 
domestic rice procurement and price policies, and (iii) a set of 12 simultaneous equations to 
estimate the functional relationships between changes in the macroeconomy and the political 
economic system of  the rice industry. 
The model has been successfully tested for the case of Korea with data covering 25 
years (1961-1985) of  adjustments in government rice procurement and pricing policies. 
The dramatic increase in  agricultural protectionism in Korea during this period can be 
explained principally by changes in the domestic rice economy that contributed to the rapid 
27 rise in the political weight of  producers and the gradual decline in political weights of  both 
government and consumers. 
The effects of  changing rural-urban terms of  trade OIl producers' political weight are 
clearly measurable through selected price and income parity ratios and the long-term 
structural decline in agriculture's share of  GOP. The measurable effects on consumers' 
political weight are found in the changing aggregate per capita income and teal price of  rice. 
Government's political weight is significandy related to its fiscal balances in the general 
budget and the more specific grain management fund The reasonable validity of  the model 
allows us to conduct simulation experiments for alternative macroeconomic expansion and 
contraction conditions. During periods of  prolonged economic expansion, political 
preference tends to favor higher producer prices and, therefore, increased production. This, 
unfortunately, coincides with declining rice consumption, thereby lessening the need to 
import. The opposite tends to prevail during contractionary times. 
The design and testing of  our analytical model, thus far, has been limited to 
capturing the endogenous nature of  agricultural policy adjustments on an incremental basis. 
Nevertheless, the way has been opened for further improvements in the specification of 
policies, the criterion function, and the transmission of  domestic and international 
macroeconomic forces into the agricultural policy reform processes of  East Asia. 
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